University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Edward H. Levi Speeches

Faculty Scholarship

7-23-1976

Statement of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of
the United States before the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice concerning H. R. 14476. 9:45
AM. Friday, July 23, 1976. Rayburn House Office Building.
Washington, D.C.
Edward H. Levi
EdwardHirsch.Levi@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech

Recommended Citation
Levi, Edward H., "Statement of the Honorable Edward H. Levi Attorney General of the United States before
the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice concerning H. R. 14476. 9:45 AM.
Friday, July 23, 1976. Rayburn House Office Building. Washington, D.C." (1976). Edward H. Levi Speeches.
42.
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/elevi_speech/42

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Edward H. Levi Speeches by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

!}cpnrhnrnt off ~lB)tiCC

STATEMENT
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNi::Y GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

TilE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SUBCO~~ITTEE

CONCERNING

lloR. 14476

9:45 A.M.
FRIDAY, JULY 23, 1976
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Co~ittee:
I appear here today in response to your invitation to
comment upon n.R. 14476 which, as you know, provides for
appointment of special prosecutors in certain cases and
establishes a Division of Government Crimes within the
Department of Justice.
H.R. 14476 represents an understandable effort to
remove personal or partisan bias -- or the public perception
of such bias

from Federal law enforcement.

an important one.

The effort is

My view is, however, that H.R. 14476 is

not the most effective or appropriate means for curing the
evils at which it is directed,

The President has proposed an

alternative to H.R. 14476 which I would also like to discuss
with you.
I should like to summarize very quickly the main provisions
of H,R. 14476.

It provides for the appointment of a temporary

special prosecutor for each case in which the President or
Attorney General has a conflict of interest or appearance of
a conflict.

"Conflict of interest" is defined in section 594(c)

(1) as "a direct and substantial personal or partisan political
interest in the outcome of the proposed criminal investigation
or prosecution."
Under the next paragraph, a conflict of interest or its
appearance is automatically deemed to exist in all cases
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involving the President, the Vice PreSident, any cabinet officer, an
l.niirldual in ~ Executive Office of the President canpe.nsated at a rate of
level V or alxJve, the Director of the FBI, and any person wOO has held such a

p:Jsition in the four years prior to the investigation or prosecution.

In

cases not involving these stated individuals a conflict of interest or its
8H?ffirana; still may be held to exist urrler other circumstances and to require

the arPJintrnent of a

~cial

prosecutor.

'I'he test \>.UU.ld be the direct and

substantial personal or partisan interest of the President or Attorney General.
Section 594 (a) provides that within thirty days of learning of a matter

in which a conflict of interest or appearance of conflict way exist, the
Attorney General must file with a special division of three judges of the
United States Court of Appeals far the District of Columbia a narorandum, which

lo.UUld l::e available to the public, setting forth (1) a smmary of

~

allegations received; (2) the results of his preliminary investigation: (3) a
Sl.lItm3rY of the infonnation relating to the [X)ssible conflict of interest; and
(4) a firrling on whether the case is "clearly frivolous" and therefore dees

rot justify any further investigation or prosecution.

A decision that an

allegation is "clearly frivolous" is rot juiicially reviewable.
terminate, unless

ne.-l

It will

allegations or evidence are received, the Court's

ability to aproint a special prosecutor.

l\bsent such a firrling by. the

Attorney General, the question of conflict of interest becanes material.
When the Atton1ey General detennines that a case does not involve a

conflict of interest, the court reviE."NS his -

Gbl
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decision de novo and appoints a specialf>prosecutor if it
disagrees with his conclusion.

If the Attorney General has

determined that the case does involve a conflict of interest
or the appearance of a conflict, the Attorney General must
appoint a special prosecutor and define his jurisdiction.
The court will then review this action to assure that the
appointee meets the statutory criteria, including breadth of
authority, and may make a superseding appointment.
In addition, Section 594(b) establishes a procedure by
which a private citizen may initiate court consideration of
the appointment of a special prosecutor thirty days after the
citizen has requested the Attorney General to consider such
an appointment.
Under section 594(d), no employee of the Federal government,
including a special prosecutor, may'be appointed a special
prosecutor.

This requires that a new special prosecutor, if

one is to be named, be named for each case.

.

Thus there could

and indeed would be a multitude of .independent special
prosecutors.
Section 595(e) gives a temporary special prosecutor the
same authority as the Assistant Attorney General for Government
Crimes -- whose authority is not defined in the bill -- and,
in addition, empowers him to appeal any court decision without
obtaining the Attorney General's approval.

Pursuant to

section 595(d) (2) a special prosecutor could be removed by
the Attorney General only for extraordinary improprieties and
then only subject to court review.

-
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In my view, H.R. 14476 is of highly questionable
constitutionality.

It would create opportunities for actual

or apparent partisan influence in law enforcement; publicize
and dignify unfounded, scurrilous allegations against public
officials; result in the continuing existence of a changing
band of mUltiplicity of special prosecutors; and promote the
possibility of unequal justice.
The role of the judiciary under H.R. 14476 raises
substantial constitutional questions.
(1)

These include:

The conferral upon a court of the power to

appoint an official who is to perform significant "executive
functions"

and who is not "inferior" to any other official 1n

the sense of being subject to direction and control;
(2)

The assignment to a court of powers (I don't know

whether Article II or II), such as the reviewing of Attorney
General appointments and decisions, which are unrelated to the
constitutionally prescribed function of deciding "cases and
controversies."
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H.R. 14476 might have several significJ,ant unintended effects,
which should be recognized.

The bill requires that the

Attorney General determine whether he or the President has
a "direct and substantial personal or partisan interest in
the outcome of a proposed criminal investigation or prosecution."
It would often be necessary for the Attorney General to consult
the President concerning matters which are, under the bill,
apparently regarded as particularly sensitive.

This would,

I think, require checking with the White House with respect to names which
nlight arise, in fact, would arise, in the course of routine criminal
investigations -- a kind of checking as to interest which
otherwise I should not think the bill would wish to require.
The bill requires that whenever the Attorney General
receives an allegation of wrongdoing which is directed against
certain high government officials or which would otherwise
present a possible conflict of interest, he must file a
detailed memorandum describing the charge and the results of
the investigation into it with the special court~

Any

individual who submits an allegation of criminal wrongdoing
to the Attorney General has the power to compel a similar
reference.

No safeguards for confidentiality are set forth.

This procedure enables any individual to convert a
private allegation against a high goveinment official into a
highly publicized investigation.

Charges of this sort could

well become the natural corollari and complement to most
civil suits involving government officials.

The fact that

such charges would be disseminated and dignified by the process
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established by the bill would inevitably enc.ourage those
who wish to use it for partisan or other improper purposes.

In enabling the criminal investigative process to be
transformed into 'a media event each time high state or federal
officials or members of Congress are involved, the bill casts
aside one of the most decent traditions of our criminal law
system.

This procedure for spreading improper charges

contributes to a public attitude of cynicism and distrust of
government officials -- again a problem which the bill is
intended to help solve.
I understand that some supporters of H.R. 14476 expected
that it would rarely require the
prosecutors.

appoint~ent

of special

But so far as we can tell from the definitions

used, the contrary would be true.

There might, for example,

at the present time be twelve investigations where a per se
conflict of interest would exist under H.R. 14476.

The

Criminal Division has located recent or current cases involving
at least 40 public officials, in the Executive Branch, the
Judiciary and the Congress, in which it would be necessary to
determine whether the President or Attorney General have, or
appear to have a substantial partisan or personal interest.
There are other cases involving campaign contributions or
politically active labor unions, or associates of prominent
political figures which conceivably under the defillition of
the bill might trigger the appointment of a special prosecutor.
I realize 'that the appointment of a temporary special
prosecutor would not be required if there is a certification

bbJ
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But I believe

that in most matters such a certification would be difficult to
give after only thirty days of investigation.

The wildest

allegations often require the most careful investigation and review
and wild allegations are to be expected.

I do not believe any

Attorney General with a sense of responsibility and a modicum of
sense would give such a certification often.
The cumulative effect of these provisions would be the
referral of many matters to numerous special prosecu~ors.

The

existence of a multiplicity of special prosecutors each with
only one case enhances the likelihood of unequal justice.
This kind of a special prosecutor would be subject to formidable
public -- and perhaps self-imposed -- pressure to indict in
the one case he was appointed to pursue.

- 8 -

Decisions regarding electronic surveillance, innnunity
and every other area of prosecutorial discretion from
plea bargaining to appeals would be made on an ad hoc
basis by many special prosecutors who are independent
of each other and have not regu1arly engaged in making
such decisions.
These objections to H.R. 14476 have been shared with
the Senate Government Operations Committee when it was
considering the verbatim counterpart of this bill.

Some

of these problems can be ameliorated but in my view not cured by
relatively simple amendments.

But I believe these fundamental

constitutional and practical difficulties still remain.
The President has submitted alternative proposed legislation, which I hope this committee will consider along with
this bill.

The President's proposal would establish a

permanent Office of Special Prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute criminal wrongdoing committed by high level government officials.

The Special Prosecutor would be appointed

by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for a single three year term.

At the end of the term,

a new Special Prosecutor would be appointed.

An individual

would be disqualified for such an appointment if during the
five previous years the individual held a high level position
of trust on the personal campaign staff of, or in an organizatioo
or political party working on behalf of, a candidate for any

CG'.
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Any allegation of criminal wrongdoing concerning the
President, Vice President, Members of Congress, or persons
compensated at the rate of Level I or II of the Executive
Schedule would be referred directly

to

the Special Prosecutor

for investigation and, if warranted, prosecution.

Although

allegations involving these officials would have to be referred to the Special Prosecutor, he could decline to assert
jurisdiction if the allegation or information has a peripheral
or incidental part of an investigation or prosecution already
being conducted elsewhere in the Department.or if, far some
other reason, the Special Prosecutor determined that it would
be in the interest of the administration of justice to permit
the matter to be handled elsewhere in the Department.

In such

cases, the Special Prosecutor could establish such procedures
as he thought necessary and appropriate to keep him informed
of the progress of the investigation or prosecution and at any
time he could assume direct responsibility for undertaking the
investigation or prosecution.
The Attorney General could also refer to the Special Prosecutor any other allegation involving a violation of criminal
law whenever he found that it was in the best interest of the
administration of justice.

The Special Prosecutor could, however,

decline to accept the referral of the allegation.

In that event.

the allegation would be investigated by the Department of Justice

r

- 10 -

in· the normal course which of course means that the investigation
might be under the supervision of the Section on Government
Crimes in the Criminal Division or conducted by a United States
Attorney's office.
Under,the President's

proposa1~

the Special Prosecutor

would have plenary authority to investigate and prosecute matters
within his jurisdiction, including the authority to appeal
adverse judicial rulings.

In the event of a disagreement

with the Special Prosecutor on an issue of law, the Attorney
General would be free to present the views of the United States
to the court before which the prosecution or appeal was lodged.
In exercising his authority, the Special Prosecutor would not
be subject to the direction or control of the Attorney General,
except as to those matters which by statute specifically require
the Attorney General's personal action, approval, or concurrence.
The President's proposal provides that

th~

grounds for

removal of a Special Prosecutor should be, and to the ma..'{imum
extent. permitted by the Constitution shall be, limited to those
which constitute extraordinary impropriety.

- 11 -

This approach, I believe, avoids the serious constitutional
issues

I don't say all -- posed by the judicial appointment process

set forth in H.R. 14476 by adopting the traditional model for the appointment of officials who perform functions exclusively executive in
nature -- nomination by the President and appointment with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
are avoided as well.

Other unfortunate consequences of H.R. 14476

The possibility of multiple special prosecutors

being appointed is eliminated.

The appointment process is not fraught

with vexing problems that arise from the vague standards which trigger
the appointment and will not publicize allegations that may ultimately
prove to be unfounded, because the appointnlent is not limited to
specific allegation.

~

Unlike H.R. 14476 which places undue pressure

upon a temporary special prosecutor to seek and secure a conviction for
the single allegation over which he has jurisdiction, this approach
allows the proper exercise of prosecutorial judgments because a
permanent special prosecutor will have a broader jurisdiction.
1 assume all recognize that in times of the greatest doubt
concerning the ability of the administration of justice to function
a special prosecutor is necessary.

In the past, a special prosecutor

has been appointed during at least some of those occasions.

I believe

it must be recognized that in addition that in those times of lingering

concern, following periods of great doubt, a special prosecutor may be
a necessary response .. The law has to rest upon the confidence and
faith of the citizenry.

I realize people will judge differently

when events cry out for this unusual remedy, or when
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the aftermath of such events makes the retention or creation of
Buch a remedy wise public policy.

The remedy itself can

cause a message of unevenness in the enforcement of the law,unless the remedy itself is perhaps regarded as vestigial,
left over from a crisis of the past, or as es'tablished in
permanent form because that is the way to avoid some of the
trauma of prior days.

And even then the fact of the remedy

may create an unevenness. But the failure to have a special
prosecutor when there is a need for reassurance
undermine faith.
obvious.

I

can further

The dilemma of the public policy decision is

believe the prevailing sentiment of those scholars

and lawyers who have considered the question

over the last

two years has been in general against the institution of a
permanent special prosecutor.

I

need hardly remind the

Chairman and this committee of those discussions.

As one approaches the question of the appointment
of a special prosecutor today--for this period--one alternative
would be to merely COIltinue the Watergate Special Prosecutor's
office now in place through the orders of the Department
until such time as this is seen to be unnecessary.
alternative seems insufficient.

Such an

The order would have to be

revised in any event and there would be a strong c!esire to
have it stand in statutory form.

The attempt to put it in

statutory forlll then becomes an exercise ill the creation of a
temporary special prosecutor, which can require a trigger
mechanism as to when it is used, or comes into

bein~,

as in

13 H. R: 14476, or some other kinds of mechanism, preswnably not yet
trieo or oeveloped, as to when the mechanism is no longer necessary.
A confrontation with these problems and other institutionalized
forms for the temporary special prosecutor suggests that it
is better to go against what was the prevailing wisdom
and to decide that among these alternatives a permanent
special prosecutor with succeeding incumbents limited to
fixed periods of appointment, and with a defined area of
automatic jurisdiction, and further jurisdiction by discretionary
referral,

is the preferable course.

That is the course which the President has taken and I urge
your favorable consideration of the President's proposal.
Mr. Chairman, there are other matters on which I
might conunent in connection with H.R. 14476, particularly
with respect to the proposal for a Division of Government
Crimes where the President has proposed an alternate way
which recognizes the steps which have been taken under

his

administration in the Department of Justice to create such
units in a way which I believe to be more workable.

We can

submit these views to you in writing or in further testimony
if you desire.

But I believe it is the Special Prosecutor

point whicll requires and of course has received the greatest
attention.
Hr. Chairman, I found when I came to my present office
about a year and a half ago that there was some kino of a

- 14 division in Washington between those who had lived through the
Watergate experience in this city, and those who like myself had
corne lately.
sure it is.

Perhaps the perspective is different . . 1 am rather
But the whole country, of course, lived through Waterga:,

And our constitutional system did work.

I assume that whatever the

perspective we have we all agree we must learn from the past but
not cherish

or at least overly cherish -- the scars.

In saying

this I do not mean to detract in the slightest fronl the awesome
concerns of that time nor for that matter from the awesome
responsibilities which government,
always carry.
us,

this Conunittee, and citizenship

I mean rather to suggest the mood with which all of

I believe, would hope to approach the question of appropriate

reforms.

I have tried to do this.

It has resulted in my own

abandonment of the received wisdom against a permanent

special

prosecutor and in my advocacy for it as against the temporary
special prosecutor.
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